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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TtiE 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE: 
SERGE B. GUDMUNDSEN, 
Disciplinary Proceeding. 
No- 14580 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a disciplinary proceeding against the appel-
lant, Serge B. Gudmundsen, brought by the Board of Commissioners 
of the Utah State Bar. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR DISCIPLINE 
The Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar, 
following a hearing before Commissioner James B. Lee, found 
the actions of the appellant in his handling of two matters 
complained of by Verus N. Thornley to be in violation of the 
Code of Professional Responsibility and Cannons of Judicial 
Ethics of the American Bar Association in the following par-
ticulars: DR2-110 (B) (3) in failing to withdraw from one 
case after his physical condition had made it unreasonably 
difficult for him to carry out his professional responsibil-
ities; DR2-110 (B) (4) for refusing to withdraw from one case 
after he had been discharged by the client, Verus N. Thornely; 
and DR9-102 (b) (4) for failing to deliver to the client funds 
in his possession which had been advanced by the client and 
to which she was entitled upon her request. 
The Board of Commissioners further found the appel-
lant's handling of one matter complained of by Charles T. 
Hales to have violated the Code of Professional Responsibility 
and Canons of Judicial Ethics of the American Bar Association 
in the following particulars: DR2-110 (B) (3) in failing to 
withdraw from the case after his physical condition had made 
it unreasonably difficult for him to carry out his professional 
responsibilities; DR2-110 (B) (4) for refusing to withdraw from 
the case after he had been discharged by the client; DR6-101 
(3) for neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him; DR7-101 (A) 
(2) for failure to fulfill his contract of employment; and 
DR9-102 (B) (3) (4) for failing to account for funds advanced 
by the client and failure to deliver said funds upon demand 
of the client. 
Based upon the above findings, the Board of Commis-
sioners of the Utah State Bar recommended to this Honorable 
Court that Serge B, Gudmundsen be suspended from the practice 
of law until he can satisfy the Board of Commissioners of the 
Utah State Bar and this Court that he is competent to practice 
law in the State of Utah. 
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RULING SOUGHT BY RESPONDENT ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests affirmance of the Findings of 
Fact and imposition of the Recommendations of the Board of Com-
missioners of the Utah State Bar upon the appellant, Serge B. 
Gudmundsen. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The action of the Board of Commissioners of the Utah 
State Bar was initiated in response to complaints filed with 
the Bar by two clients of the appellant, Serge B. Gudmundsen 
(TR 8-11). The fact pattern in each complaint is highly similar 
Mrs. Verus N. Thornley and her minor son were charged 
with disturbing the peace in a complaint filed by her neighbor 
following a verbal altercation between the two. Mrs. Thornley 
contacted Mr. Gudmundsen to defend herself and her son in the 
criminal matters and to bring a civil suit against the neighbor 
for damages arising from a long history of such hostile inci-
dents (TR 88). In an oral agreement, Mr. Gudmundsen agreed to 
represent the Thornleys in all three matters for $200.00 for 
each criminal case, and $1,100.00 for the civil suit (TR 89). 
I 
It was Mrs. Thornley's understanding that these fees would 
fully cover each action and the entire fqe of $1,500.00 was 
paid to Mr. Gudmundsen shortly thereafter1 (TR 90). The evi-
dence submitted at the Bar hearing and the Findings of Facts 
of the Bar Commissioners show that Mr. Gudmundsen fully defended 
-3-
Mrs, Thornley in the criminal proceeding against herself 
(TR 91-93, Finding of Fact No, 2), did nothing to represent 
Mrs. Thornleyfs minor son (TR 93-94, Findings of Fact No. 3), 
and proceeded slowly and erratically on the civil suit despite 
his client's frequent demands for more diligent progress until 
his health forced him to discontinue his practice in the sum-
mer of 1974, nearly two years after the agreement between he 
and Mrs. Thornley had first been reached (TR 94-109). During 
that time, the only known action taken by Mr. Gudmundsen was 
to file a complaint (TR 98), file a Notice of Readiness for 
Trial (See State Bar Exhibit 14), and take the defendant 
neighbor's deposition and accompany Mrs. Thornley to her 
deposition (TR 103)• 
Immediately following the conclusion of the criminal 
trial, Mrs. Thornley expressed reservations about continuing 
the civil suit, but was strongly encouraged by Mr. Gudmundsen 
that a suit alleging malicious prosecution would have a good 
chance for success (TR 95-96). At a subsequent meeting, Mrs. 
Thornley again expressed her reservations about continuing 
the suit, but consented to proceeding when told that only a 
partial refund of her fee was possible due to time and effort 
expended in preparation (TR 99-100). At a later date, after 
numerous delays, Mrs. Thornley informed Mr. Gudmundsen by 
letter that he was to withdraw as attorney for plaintiff, and 
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refund all unearned fees immediately with J an accounting (State 
Bar Exhibit No. 15). Mrs. Thornley also demanded refund ad-
vanced for defense of her minor son since the charge had been 
dismissed on the Juvenile Court's own motion and without any 
apparent effort by Mr. Gudmundsen (State Bar Exhibit No. 15). 
Following receipt of this letter, the appellant herein called 
Mrs. Thornley and again convinced her to continue with him-
self as counsel while promising greater diligence (TR 102-103). 
Prior to this incident, which occurred more than thirteen 
months after their initial meeting, only the complaint had 
been filed. Thereafter, the Notice of Readiness was filed 
and depositions were taken. Several months later, Mr. Gud-
mundsen advised Mrs. Thornley not to plan a vacation for the 
upcoming summer since trial was imminent (TR 104). By the 
middle of that summer, appellant had suspended his practice 
without notice to his client. The next information Mrs. 
Thornley received indicated Mr. Vlahos had entered the case 
as substitute counsel and was entering appearances on her 
behalf at various hearings without her knowledge, including 
one on a Motion for Summary Judgment initiated by the defend-
ant (TR 105). Beyond the last mentioned meeting, Mrs. Thornley 
was unable to locate or communicate with Mr. Gudmundsen 
(TR 104-109). 
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The second complaint was made by Mr, Charles T. 
Hales who retained Mr, Gudmundsen after being arrested and 
charged along with his wife with driving under the influence 
and public intoxication. At their first meeting, appellant 
suggested to Mr, Hales that he also file a false arrest suit 
against the arresting officers for the brutal treatment he 
received during his custody in connection with these charges. 
Mr, Hales accepted this advice (TR 22). Mr, Gudmundsen then 
agreed to represent the Hales on all three matters for $200.00 
for each criminal charge and $1,800.00 for Mr. Hales1 false 
arrest and battery suit (TR 19-21), Appellant did fully de-
fend both Mr. and Mrs. Hales in criminal actions attaining 
a not guilty verdict for Mr, Hales, and eventual dismissal of 
the charges against Mrs. Hales (TR 24-25). As in Mrs. Thornleyfs 
case, these events occurred over a period of approximately 
twenty-two (22) months. During that time, appellant did not 
file the complaint in the civil suit or perform any work known 
to Mr. Hales, despite the fact that Mr. Hales was acquitted of 
the charges against him within a couple of weeks of their first 
meeting. During this twenty-two (22) month period Mr, Hales 
contacted Mr. Gudmundsen numerous times -- each time receiving 
assurances that the complaint would be prepared for his signa-
ture with days. Like Mrs. Thornley, Mr, Hales also terminated 
Mr, Gudmundsen demanding an accounting and refund of all un-
earned fees (State Bar Exhibit No. 5), only to be talked out 
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of that decision on appellant's promises to proceed with pro-
per diligence in the future (TR 26-27, defendant's exhibit No. 3). 
Eventually, Mr. Hales was forced to retaiii another attorney and 
obtain a judgment in state district court (before he could get 
a refund on any of the fee he advanced (State Bar Exhibit No. 1). 
During the interim, appellant made no accounting or refund of 
Mr* Hales1 moneys despite numerous letters of demand and visits 
to appellant's office by Mr. Hales' seconcji attorney, Mr. Farr 
(TR 28-29 State Bar Exhibits 4, 6-10). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT WAS AFFORDED A FAIR 
AND ADEQUATE HEARING 
Respondent agrees with appellant's contention that 
due process of law requires a fair and adequate hearing in con-
nection with matters such as that presented here, but denies 
that the hearing in this case precluded the presentation of a 
valid defense. The Hearing Commissioner ipully acknowledged 
Mr. Gudmundsen's inability to attend for reasons of bad health 
(TR 5-7). At the outset of the hearing, Commissioner Lee asked 
counsel for Mr. Gudmundsen if he had any objection to the pro-
ceeding on the grounds that appellant's rights would be pre-
judiced by his absence. Counsel responded that Mr. Gudmundsen 
had authorized his counsel to represent him at the proceeding 
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and agreed to the hearing going forward at that time (TR 5) . 
Appellant's counsel further indicated that no firm date could 
be predicted when appellant would be sufficiently recovered 
to attend the hearing. In the course of his reply, counsel 
for Mr. Gudmundsen seemed most concerned with the record re-
flecting that Mr. Gudmundsenfs absence was due to his continu-
ing health problems, and at no point did he make an explicit 
or strenuous objection to the proceeding going forward in Mr. 
Gudmundsen1s absence (TR 5-6). Following counsel's response, 
the Hearing Commissioner noted the numerous continuances al-
ready extended to appellant and concluded that a diligent han-
dling of these complaints coupled with the protection afforded 
Mr. Gudmundsen's rights by the presence of his counsel re-
quired that the hearing commence. This decision by the 
Hearing Examiner was neither arbitrary, unfair, nor pre-
judicial to the rights of the appellant herein. 
At Page 9 of his brief, appellant states: "An exami-
nation of the transcript from the court will evidence that the 
counsel for the appellant was indeed unable to make an adequate 
defense of his client . . . for appellant was repeatedly denied 
opportunities to introduce matters in contradiction and miti-
gation of testimony of the adverse witnesses by reason of the 
absence of the appellant." It is interesting to note that this 
purely conclusory statement is not supported by any citation 
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to any portion of the record revealing an^ refusal to admit 
any evidence or information contradicting that given by the 
witnesses and complainants at this hearing. In fact, the 
transcript discloses that counsel for the appellant made no 
proffer of or reference to any type of evidence or information 
which could contradict or qualify or in a^ ty way change the 
meaning of any of the evidence submitted by the complainants 
and witnesses in this hearing. Appellant's brief to this 
Honorable Court is likewise void of any reference to or indi-
cation of the existence of any evidence or information which 
would mitigate or disprove the charges brought against the 
appellant in this proceeding, or any other explanation of the 
meaning of this allegation. 
Moreover, the medical evidence submitted to the Hear-
ing Examiner to establish appellant's inability to attend dis-
cussed only appellant's inability to travel due to the deli-
cacy of the surgery performed on his eyes. Since appellant, 
Serge B. Gudmundsen, was personally responding to interroga-
tories in the law suit initiated against him by Mr. Hales 
just shortly before the date of this hearing, it must be con-
cluded that Mr. Gudmundsen was capable of comprehending ques-
tions and framing answers relating to these matters. Appellant, 
therefore, could have prepared affidavits for this hearing or 
could have been deposed by his own counsel for purposes of 
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preparing an admissible evidentuary record on his own behalf. 
Similarly, appellant was not prohibited from introducing his 
files on these cases to demonstrate the extent of his diligence 
and work product. Appellant was, therefore, not denied the op-
portunity to present a valid defense merely because he was not 
present and the hearing was conducted under the Rules of Evi-
dence in effect in the District Courts of this State. 
The effect of this argument by the appellant is to 
boot-strap a defense where none exists. That is, appellant 
declined to offer a defense when he had the opportunity to do 
so, and now he submits to this Honorable Court that the absence 
of that defense is denial of due process. The fact is, appel-
lant was afforded every reasonable opportunity to rebut the 
information alleged in the complaints filed by Mrs. Thornley 
and Mr. Hales, and so received a fair and adequate hearing. 
POINT II 
THE PROCEDURE CHALLENGED HEREIN 
WAS PROPERLY CONDUCTED AND THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF 
THE UTAH STATE BAR WERE NOT DRAWN 
ARBITRARILY FOLLOWING THAT PROCEEDING. 
Respondent fully agrees with appellant's contention 
that it is the power and duty of this Honorable Court to review 
the record in this matter to insure that the hearing was pro-
perly conducted and that the Findings of Fact and Recommenda-
tions published by the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State 
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Bar were not arbitrarily drawn from the evidence produced at 
that hearing* Indeed, this review could not proceed other-
wise since it is the sole and exclusive province of this Court 
to impose the penalties recommended by the Board of Commissioners, 
In respect to these duties and responsibilities, re-
spondent denies that this Court has not been presented with 
any significant evidence because of arbitrary or improper ex-
clusion at the hearing challenged herein. Again, appellant 
had every reasonable opportunity to present alternative forms 
of direct testimony such as affidavits, depositions, or docu-
ments from his case files to rebut the allegations contained 
in the complaints made against him to the State Bar. This is 
nothing more than the same boot-strap argument made before, 
that because appellant declined to put on a defense the findings 
and recommendations of the Board of Commissioners are arbitrary 
for being one-sided. In fact, there is substantial evidence 
in the record for every finding reached by the Board of Com-
missioners. Against that evidence, the hearing record is void 
of any proffer or indication of any evidence or information 
which would contradict, mitigate, or otherwise qualify the 
evidence supporting the findings published by the Board of 
Commissioners. Similarly, appellant's brief fails to cite 
this Court to one instance where any evidence of substantial 
importance was excluded by the Hearing Examiner, or any men-
tion or protest of appellant's counsel that such evidence 
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existed and could not be presented unless the hearing was post-
poned until the appellant could appear personally. As such, 
apart from appellant's conclusory statements there is no infor-
mation before this Court which would indicate that it does not 
have before it all the evidence pertinent to this matter. 
Appellant argues in his brief that he was denied due 
process by being prevented from introducing evidence that the 
demands of the complainants were unreasonable when the work pro-
duct of the appellant was compared to the total fees received. 
First, the evidence presented was that the fees for each indi-
vidual action were agreed to before money was paid by either 
of the complainants, and the appellant himself at Page 12 of 
his brief cites Utah Code Annotated 78-51-41 for the proposi-
tion that the rate of compensation for legal services is a mat-
ter wholly between the attorney and his client. That evidence 
would need to be rebutted before this argument would have been 
material. No such rebuttal evidence was offered. 
Second, such evidence is immaterial to the charges 
made against Mr. Gudmundsen regardless of the fee agreements. 
This is a disbarment action, not a suit for recovery of un-
earned fees. Appellant has been charged with failure to ac-
count for fees paid when so requested by his clients, failure 
to withdraw when requested, failure to withdraw after he be-
came physically incapable of continuing his work, substitution 
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of counsel without the consent of his client, neglect of 
a legal matter entrusted to him, failure to carry out his 
contract of employment, and prejudice of his client's case 
by his actions. Whether in the opinion of anyone else he 
earned more than the originally stipulated fees in his cri-
minal defanse of any of these individuals has no bearing on 
any of the above charges. For the same reasons, appellant's 
inclusions of an affidavit referring to the settlements of 
each claim, one in satisfaction of the judgment resulting 
from Mr. Hales1 law suit, and the other from an out of court 
settlement with Mrs. Thornley, has no bearing upon the charges 
presented here whatsoever. In the final analysis, this whole 
line of argument presents a complete confusion between dis-
barment charges and a suit for return of unearned fees when 
the two are separate and distinct proceedings relying on dif-
ferent charges, considerations, and defenses. To raise in one 
proceeding a defense unique to the other, as appellant does 
here, is simply not to respond to the charge at issue. Appel-
lant made the same objection in respect to Mr. Hales' complaint 
at the Bar Hearing and it was properly denied by the Hearing 
Examiner for the same reasons presented ncjw. 
Thirdly, as has been discussed previously, appellant 
had every reasonable opportunity to submit all proper and mater-
ial evidence he could otherwise offer if present personally 
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through deposition or affidavit or submission of his case file 
into evidence. The fact is, if he had any material evidence to 
present on his behalf he declined to do so, and so has no stand-
ing to complain of that fact now* 
CONCLUSION 
The record in this matter clearly discloses that 
appellant herein was afforded a fair and adequate hearing in 
this disciplinary proceeding. The Findings of Fact and recom-
mendations of the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar 
presented to this Honorable Court are all based on substantial 
and uncontroverted evidence presented by the complaining parties 
and their witnesses. At this hearing the appellant had the op-
portunity but declined to present positive evidence in rebuttal 
of that offered by the prosecutor for the State Bar. The errors 
alleged by the appellant on this appeal are inconsistent with 
the record or immaterial to the complaints lodged by the com-
plainants herein. This hearing procedure was, therefore, pro-
per and there is no evidence that the record presented to this 
Court does not contain all of the material evidence and informa-
tion necessary for this Court to fully review this matter and 
take final action. The ultimate settlement of the monetary 
aspects of Mrs. ThornleyTs and Mr. Hales1 complaints cannot 
alter the important facts which establish that the manner in 
which Mr. Gudmundsen handled their cases constituted a breach 
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of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Cannons of 
Judicial Ethics in several particulars for which reason this 
Court should suspend Serge B. Gudmundsen'p authority to prac-
tice law until he can demonstrate to this Court that he is 
able to resume practice in a competent and responsible manner. 
Respectfully submitted, 
1 f*t"\ / '- /^ 
P. KEITH NELSON 
Attorney for Respondent 
716 Newhouse Office Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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